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This paper examines marital instabilities in the transnational social field connecting
Pakistan and Britain, distinguishing between first marriages and remarriages. In
British Pakistani families, national statistics show transnational marriage to be the
dominant practice, although there is significant differentiation in its popularity. I show
that in their remarriages, participants reevaluate the merits of transnational marriage,
based on their experience of their unsuccessful first marriage. Despite considerable
ambivalence towards cross-border marriage, remarriage continues to be a channel
for marriage migration because British nationality, citizenship and permanent settle-
ment status can raise a participant's marital capital in a transnational social field,
mitigating the devalued identity associated with divorce. Overall, the material raises
concerns about internal racial discrimination and the harmful immigration policies
that enable and support such processes. I show the necessity of adopting a combined
intersectional and transnational approach to the study of transnational divorce.
K E YWORD S
British Pakistani, immigration rules, internal racism, intersectionality, remarriage,
transnationalism
1 | INTRODUCTION
Zulfi was 37 years old when I met him for an interview at a fast food
restaurant in East London. Deploying a dry wit, he described his
marital status as ‘Nomadic divorcing bloke’. At college, Zulfi had
studied sociology, and you could tell. He was uncomfortable with
terms like arranged marriage and love marriage, seeing them as cli-
chés. Making quote marks in the air, he described his first marriage as
more on the latter line, but this side of his divorce—although he had
met ‘a few potentials’ off his own initiative—he was toying with the
idea of an arranged marriage. It was Zulfi who used the term ‘marriage
market’ to describe his situation as a divorcee facing remarriage:
I was speaking to my dad the other day, I said, ‘Look,
dad, when I'm ready don't bother looking for a rishta
(match, proposal) for me’. He said, ‘Why's that?’ I said,
‘Dad, what it is, when you're putting me out on the
market …’ because that's how it is with the arranged
marriage scenario … I said to my dad, ‘I'm not trying to
be rude, yeah … I'll look myself.’ And do you know why
I said that to him? I said to him, ‘Look, you're telling
these Asians who you're looking for a potential for me,
first of all I'm a 37-year-old guy and a divorcee’ which,
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you know, like on a pecking order … [Laughter] Already
divorced with two kids, yeah? So already you're
coming down a few notches. Unfortunately, just like,
being a single parent, you know, you're less than a
bachelor girl. That's the reality. Does that make sense
what I'm trying to say?
Kaveri: In the market.
In the market, that's the point I'm trying to make, it's a
marriage market.
In this excerpt, Zulfi weighs up his prospects in the ‘marriage
market’—a term encapsulating the assessment of various forms of
capital that may affect the prospects of a potential spouse—and
does not like what he sees. As a man in his late 30s, and a div-
orcee with children from his previous marriage, he does not fancy
the chances of his family finding him a good match in an arranged
marriage. With self-deprecatory humour, he recognises his low
ranking in the ‘pecking order’. Nevertheless, he anticipates that he
probably would, eventually, entertain a proposal from Pakistan.
As much as divorcees go ‘down a few notches’ in the game, he
felt confident that, as a man, there was always the option of
marrying a second time in Pakistan. Referring to the then recent
2012 legislation introduced by the Coalition government, which
restricted marriage migration by introducing a minimum income
requirement of £18,600 for sponsors of immigrant spouses,
he said:
Now I'm thinking I've only got one way to get back into
the game [chuckles] and eventually the Tory Party's
gonna stop that, am I making sense? So this is what it
boils down to.
A lot of the guys, no matter what age they are, it's
ok for them, they go ‘back home’ and get one. And
generally the girls are marriageable age, so the age of
21 to 25. Ok, some of them probably lie about their
age a little bit, but the guys, even at my age, they'd go
and get one. That's the unfair world we live in. And I
think this is the point we've got to address here, that
it's an unfair world we live in.
In this paper, I examine the ‘marriagescapes’ (Constable, 2005)
in the dense transnational social field (Levitt & Glick Schiller, 2004)
connecting the United Kingdom and Pakistan, in which cross-
border marriages continue to be extremely prominent, even if their
popularity may not be unanimous. Transnational marriages have
been said to be unstable, ‘conflicting views caus[ing] severe chal-
lenges’ (Groes & Fernandez, 2018: 9). Here, I show that divorce
may alter considerations of transnational marriage in complex
ways. In remarriages, we see people making different calculations
about the merits of marrying ‘here’ or ‘there’, in ways that
are informed by the experience of their own unsuccessful first
marriages. Second, as Zulfi identifies above, divorce engenders
a gendered devaluation of identity, a ‘spoiled identity’
(Goffman, 1963) which may be circumvented by family networks
stretched across borders, which expand the field of potential mar-
riage partners. In spite of the identity stain of divorce, however,
some individuals—specifically migrants—may in other ways inhabit a
more powerful position in the ‘marriage market’ in their
remarriages, if they were able to acquire permanent settlement
during their first marriage. As this implies, there is a need to
approach transnational divorce and remarriage through theories of
intersectional feminism, which offers crucial insights to how the
exercise of power may depend on the interlocking and intersecting
of social locations.
In what follows, I attempt to develop Zulfi's conclusion that
‘it's an unfair world we live in’ by joining recent voices extending
intersectional analyses to the transnational scale. Research on
transnationalism has long been concerned with gender as an aspect
of social location. Mahler and Pessar's (2001) framework of ‘gen-
dered geographies of power’ explicitly grappled with gendered
agency across a range of geosocial scales, from the local to the
transnational, and their focus on social location showed marked
affinities with intersectional feminism. This critique, beginning
among Black feminists in the United States, argued that women's
experiences of their gender cannot be separated from gender's
intersections with, race/ethnicity, class and other systems of
oppression and that these multiple aspects of identity may inter-
lock and combine in individuals in ways that give or deny power
(Crenshaw, 1991). More recently, Purkayastha (2012) and
Patil (2013) have highlighted the need for intersectional feminism
to attend to cross-border dynamics, and in the context of family
life, Mahler, Chaudhuri, and Patil (2015) have shown how the
intersections of gendered power shift when our analysis moves
between intimate, local and transnational scales. Building on this
conversation, Fresnoza-Flot and Shinozaki (2017) have sought to
theorise generation more robustly as a relational concept imbued
with power, as an axis of differentiation between first-generation
migrants and the so-called second generations, that needs to be
more widely examined in intersectional analyses.
This paper takes up this productive direction of thinking and,
like other contributions in this special issue, examines the particular
contexts of gendered power associated with divorce in a transna-
tional social field. Unlike other contributions, I focus on
remarriage—an issue submerged until recently in discussions of
divorce, but one Grover (2014: 329) argues to be an ‘important
site for feminist intervention and further debate’ in which ‘much
still remains to be understood about gendered choices, desires and
subjectivities’. Augmenting our understandings of remarriage, I sug-
gest that gendered power in remarriages is contingent to
intersectional influences on marital capital. Further, I highlight that
these are not stable across the United Kingdom and Pakistan, or
across generations, and that racialised hierarchies of nationality and
citizenship may also be traversed through a marital history. I will
now detail key aspects of the research context to this study of
remarriage.
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2 | BRITISH PAKISTANI TRANSNATIONAL
MARRIAGES, DIVORCE AND REMARRIAGE
Public and policy debates in the United Kingdom have increasingly
pathologised transnational marriage, particularly from South Asia, the
largest regional source of spousal immigration (Charsley, Bolognani,
Ersanilli, & Spencer, 2020: 8). In keeping with policies restricting
transnational marriages across Europe (Bonjour & Block, 2016),
U.K. governments have increasingly discouraged British South Asians
from entering into transnational marriages, arguing that they create
‘greater levels of patriarchal control or uneven balances of power in a
relationship; the acceptance of “home country” norms in terms of
both domestic abuse and a woman's role in the home; [and] insular
communities that deal with problems internally and [are] less likely to
engage with services or mix with others’ (Casey, 2016: 108).
This governmental concern over women's low position in transna-
tional marriages is more than a little galling, as domestic violence
scholars claim that these negative policy representations have enabled
immigration legislation that has actually created the conditions for
abuse of immigrant spouses. In 2012, the Conservative-Liberal
Democrat government introduced the legislation to which Zulfi
referred above, which sought to restrict marriage migration by raising
the required level of English, introducing a minimum income require-
ment of £18,600 for sponsors of immigrant spouses, and extending the
probationary period before spouses could apply for permanent settle-
ment, formerly from two, to now 5 years. This increase in the duration
of the probationary visa was in spite of trenchant protest by South
Asian feminist organisations, which have argued that probationary visa
rules make migrant spouses systematically vulnerable to the threat of
deportation should they exit an abusive marriage before becoming eli-
gible for permanent settlement, whilst the No Recourse to Public
Funds rule denied them access to social security and welfare support
in resisting or escaping abuse (Anitha, 2011; Sharma & Gill, 2010).
Concerted campaigning led to the introduction of a Domestic Violence
Rule, entitling spousal migrants facing domestic abuse to apply for
Indefinite Leave to Remain before the end of their probationary visa,
and without the endorsement of their spouse; and to a new Destitu-
tion Domestic Violence Concession, entitling such claimants to
3 months of access to public funds whilst their application for settle-
ment in the United Kingdom is considered. However, the burden of
proof for migrant spouses applying for the Domestic Violence Rule
remains forbiddingly high, and 3 months of financial support woefully
inadequate, leading Mirza (2016) to explicitly name these immigration
rules as ‘harmful’. Furthermore, these rules apply only to those who
arrive in the United Kingdom on spousal visas, omitting the significant
numbers of abused migrants who have other types of visas with the
No Recourse to Public Fund condition (Southall Black Sisters, 2020).
From the perspective of immigration law and public policy, there-
fore, transnational marriages have been increasingly demonised. For
the British Pakistani families with whom I worked, however, perspec-
tives on transnational marriage are more complex. Statistics based on
survey data show that transnational marriage continues to be the
predominant form of marital alliance among British Pakistani Muslims.
Between 2004 and 2018, some 53% of British-born Pakistani Muslim
spouses were married to a coethnic from Pakistan, 37% of men and
40% of women were married to a coethnic from the United Kingdom,
and 9% of men and 7% of women were married to someone from a
different ethnic group (Charsley, Bolognani, Ersanilli, & Spencer, 2020:
89): these statistics do not, it should be noted, distinguish between first
marriages and remarriages. For men, there has been a downward trend
in transnational marriage over time, with much higher proportions of
those born in the 1950s and 1960s married transnationally than those
born in the 1970s and 1980s; this pattern is not seen straightforwardly
among women (90). There are gender differences, too, in the associa-
tions between education and transnational marriage. For men, lower
levels of education are associated with higher levels of transnational
marriage. For women, it is those with secondary school qualifications
who are more likely to be in a transnational marriage than either those
without qualifications or those with postsecondary education—a
difference Charsley et al. suggest may relate to the difficulties, for
women, of meeting financial requirements for sponsoring the immigra-
tion of a spouse for those with low levels of education (96, 100).
This differentiation in the popularity of transnational marriages is
also reflected in equivocal stereotypes about migrant spouses
from Pakistan among British-born Pakistanis, which Charsley and
Bolognani (2017: 50) have recently brought to light. In this important
work, they problematize British-born participants' use of the term
‘freshie’, to describe recent immigrants from Pakistan, as an
‘internalization of colonial racial/ethnic hierarchies’. Sociological litera-
ture has widely interpreted the use of racial slurs such as ‘Fresh Off the
Boat’ as a form of internal racism or intra-ethnic othering, reflecting
the negotiation of local hierarchies of belonging (McAuliffe, 2008;
Phoenix, 2011; Pyke & Dang, 2003). However, among British
Pakistanis, for whom transnational migration remains so prominent, it
is intriguing that depictions of ‘freshies’ overlap to a very large degree
with those of themangetar, a Punjabi and Urdu term meaning fiancé/e,
as a synonym which Charsley and Bolognani (2017: 56) say shares
‘the lack of [cultural] capital of the freshie, but [is] also characterised by
a lack of domestic gendered power’. These negative evaluations of the
‘freshie’ and mangetar point to pervasive ambivalences about
transnational marriage as a channel for continued migration.
As Charsley's (2013) earlier work has shown, transnational mar-
riages have complex economic, cultural and emotional underpinnings,
amongst which are the hopes of many parents and participants that a
transnational marriage will reduce the risk of marriage breakdown by
ensuring continued commitment to shared religious, marital and family
values. Yet such discussions jar with expressions of concern about
transnational marriages in terms of disjunctive conjugal expectations,
as reflected in the small academic literature on divorce or lone parent-
hood among British Asians, which identifies ‘incompatibility’ in mar-
riages involving transnational migration as a prominent cause of
marital breakdown alongside a set of culturally particular instabilities
connected to traditions of arranged marriage and wider family involve-
ment (see, e.g., Bano, 2012; Das, 2011). Statistics based on survey data
indicate that, compared to 4% in the mid-1990s, by 2010–13, 10% of
ever-married Pakistani Muslims were currently separated or
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divorced—an underestimate of the full extent of divorce because it
excludes those who have remarried, whose marital status would be
denoted as currently married (Qureshi, 2016: 3–5). Amid this
increased prevalence of divorce, there are signs of wider reevaluation
of the stability of transnational and arranged marriage. In my study of
British South Asian divorces, I have documented some distinctive
instabilities of transnational marriages, within a broader landscape of
marital discontent. Transnational marriages generated conflicts over
disjunctive conjugal expectations, forming a cluster within a broader
set of conflicts concerning a lack of intimacies (Qureshi, 2016: 85–94).
Transnational marriages engendered economic conflicts associated
with responsibilities to remit money to kin in Pakistan, or husbands'
inability to embody masculine breadwinning expectations—associated
with low earnings due to downward social mobility—forming a cluster
within a broader landscape of marital conflicts over finances and eco-
nomic abuse (73–9). Immigration insecurity during the probationary
spouse visa rendered migrant spouses unable to exit abusive marriages
because of immigration insecurities and economic precarity; con-
versely, British-born women married to Pakistani nationals described
the endorsement of their spouse's Indefinite Leave to Remain as a
point of coercive control (79–85). Such conflicts formed part of a
broader cluster of divorce narratives concerning refusal to domestic
control. In the wake of such marital breakdowns, some participants,
and their parents, express misgivings about transnational marriages.
Alongside these negative evaluations of transnational marriage,
however, are the workings of remarriage ‘markets’. There is some
degree of a devaluation of identity associated with divorced status.
Further, this devaluation intersects with gender identity in complex
ways, reflected in statistics showing that the percentages reporting
separated or divorced status are dramatically higher for ever-married
women than men, and thus, that men are more likely to remarry
(Qureshi, 2016: 216–7). As suggested by the quotes from Zulfi, this is
partly because of the tendency for women to be the primary caregivers
for any children resulting from a first marriage, but it is also because
presumed sexual experience detracts more for a woman than for a
man (Qureshi, 2016: 224). Although my wider study suggests that the
stigma of divorce is attenuating, with divorced women and men both
being encouraged by their natal families to remarry (Qureshi, 2016:
245–61), it also raises further questions about how the stigma of
divorce may intersect with other aspects of social location.
This intersecting of stigma is not well captured by
Goffman's (1963: 9) classic theory of stigma as the process of an iden-
tity becoming ‘disqualified from full social acceptance’. As Tyler (2018)
has recently argued, Goffman's analysis of stigma has limited applica-
tion to intersectional analyses, due to his deliberate bracketing off of
economic and political structures—specifically, the violent regimes of
racial stigma that were being challenged during Goffman's career. In
the existing literature, there are some suggestions that the stigma
associated with divorce may be contingent, in the transnational social
field, to racialised citizenship and nationality status. For example,
although noting that participants ‘generally did not provide critical
assessments of their own or their spouse's marital capital’, Charsley,
Bolognani, Ersanilli, and Spencer (2020), point to ‘hints of issues which
might have hindered the British partners' chances of a “good match”
in the UK’ in some of the transnational marriages they encountered,
including limited education or employment prospects, and also trou-
bled reputations, health conditions or divorced status, especially for
women (p.103). Conversely, Mirza (2016: 599-600) documents how
for migrant women the stigma of a failed first marriage may recede
and give way to even respect once they acquire Indefinite Leave to
Remain: ‘everyone respected me there [in Pakistan] only because I
have a visa’; ‘whenever anyone hears that I have a visa they come and
ask for my hand in marriage’. In what follows, I therefore develop an
intersectional analysis taking into consideration the ways in which
divorced status may interact with gender differently at multiple
geosocial scales, over different generations, and over an individual's
migration and settlement history.
3 | RESEARCH SETTING AND METHODS
Between 2012 and 14, I undertook an ethnographic study of marital
breakdown in working class Pakistani Muslim families in East London
and Peterborough. Both are localities with significant populations of
people of Pakistani Muslim heritage, and both have been described as
‘super-diverse’ (Erel, 2011; Vertovec, 2007), with ongoing immigration
from Pakistan through asylum, student and irregular routes combined
with continued marriage migration channelled to established families,
which has diversified population and generational structures. The eth-
nic category of British Pakistani Muslim masks significant power and
status distinctions between individuals who are socio-economically
differentiated and legally stratified—a strong motivation for adopting
an intersectional lens.
The study involved interviews with 74 participants who had
experienced marital breakdown: 51 women and 23 men. I recruited
these participants to the study through residential fieldwork, and with
the help of Shareen Akhtar, who worked as a community research
facilitator and introduced me to half of the study participants and
attended four interviews. I recruited the other half of the informants
myself, through snowballing and returning to others whom I had come
to know during earlier research in 2005–2007 and 2011. I am
identified as White British, which led to complex permutations of con-
nection and disconnection with the study participants. Despite being
a racial/ethnic outsider, I was in other ways connected intimately to
the study participants because of the extent to which I cared about
their stories of marital breakdown. My female gendering no doubt
contributed to the rapport I was able to develop and to participants'
acceptance of my attentive listening as a form of care.
The 74 participants generated a corpus of narratives about
116 marriages, of which the majority were what I will describe for the
purposes of this paper as transnational: marriages involving one person
who was British-born and raised, and one person who was Pakistan-
born (71 marriages). The rest were either between two people who
were Pakistan-born, either because both spouses had already married
in Pakistan prior to their migration, or because a migrant from Pakistan
had remarried to someone in or from Pakistan (23 marriages); or
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between two British-born spouses (22 marriages; this latter category
included the majority of the inter-ethnic marriages in the study1). The
strong profile of marriage migration in the study does not reflect the
national statistics on the prevalence of transnational marriage, noted
above, but rather, the highly migratory character of the two localities.
In this paper, I focus on the subset of the participants who had
divorced or separated from their first marriage (52 of the 74
informants in the wider study) and within that, on those divorced
informants who had subsequently remarried (30 informants). I have
compared across the various remarriage trajectories—whether
the transnational form of the first marriage was repeated in the
remarriage, or reversed—and analysed the reasonings that participants
described for remarrying ‘here’ or ‘there’.
3.1 | The reevaluation of transnational marriages
There were 10 remarried informants who repeated the transnational
form of their first marriage in their remarriage. They had often exited
first marriages involving the set of marital conflicts associated with
transnational marriages, which I outlined above (Qureshi, 2016:
73–95). However, this does not mean they were unambiguous about
the merits of transnational marriage, and their interviews often
describe reevaluation of the wisdom of marrying ‘there’ in the context
of a remarriage.
British-born Afshan is a case in point. When I first interviewed
her, Afshan, aged 23, was already a divorced mother with daughters
aged five and seven. Whilst studies argue that consent and coercion
in relation to marriage are not binaries but two ends of a continuum,
between which lie degrees of expectation, persuasion, pressure and
threat (Anitha & Gill, 2009), Afshan herself characterised her first
marriage—aged 15, to a paternal cousin in Pakistan—as very unambig-
uously forced. Showing the workings of ‘everyday bordering’
(Wemyss, Yuval-Davis, & Cassidy, 2018)—where state borders move
from the margins of people's lives, encountered just at airports, to
become part of everyday experience—Afshan depicted the marriage
as an archetypical ‘sham marriage’, where she first took the marriage
to be ‘genuine’, but the very moment her husband got his Indefinite
Leave to Remain, ‘he just changed’. Narratives of physical violence
and psychological abuse, directed at her and their two daughters,
followed. Later, she revealed details that might allow us to interpret
this abuse in light of migratory challenges to her husband's masculinity
(Charsley, 2013), talking, for example, about her husband's involve-
ment in Afshan's father's family business and—after the business was
bankrupted—their financial pressures and the emotional demands on
them as a couple living at Afshan's parents' house.
When I interviewed Afshan in 2005, she had been divorced for
2 years and was contemplating remarriage. By 2007, she had rem-
arried and was 4 months pregnant with the first baby through her sec-
ond marriage. Her husband was from Pakistan, and still there, waiting
for his spouse visa. The match had been set up through Afshan's
brother's wife, who was a migrant from Pakistan. Afshan's second
husband was educated to masters level and worked as an IT
professional. This was his first marriage. He now stood to immigrate
to the United Kingdom, but he had not seemingly been searching for
a British-based proposal, and according to Afshan, he was well settled
in the IT sector, had good prospects in Pakistan and was ambivalent
about the move. Although Afshan depicted her second husband as
sanguine about migration to the United Kingdom, unlike her first
husband, she remained very cautious about the risks of entering into
another transnational marriage. She therefore sought to protect
herself and her daughters through a prenuptial agreement with her
new husband, in which he had committed to provide financially. She
had made it explicit that the flat she had salvaged from her divorce
would remain solely in her name, even if her second husband would
be paying the mortgage. As she said,
I'm gonna make my husband work. He0s going to pay
me. Pay all the repayments.
It's not like I've haven't spoken to him about it, I've
spoken to him I've explained it to him, I've explained
my situation to him and I've said at first, before the
wedding, before we had the ceremony I did say to him
I said, ‘if you want to come to London, if it's only for a
visa I can call you as a student. I can help you get to
London. But I don't want you to play with my feelings’.
And he said ‘No, it's nothing like that’. He said, to me
‘you can come and live in Pakistan with the kids’, but I
did stay in Pakistan for a few months and I find it quite
hard there. I don't like living there.
She was supported in all this by her older brother and her mother,
who I interviewed too, who was also deeply anxious about the pros-
pect of her new son-in-law being insincere and interested in Afshan
‘just for the visa’. This example shows the extent to which Afshan and
her family were trying to minimise the risks that they associated with
another transnational union. These risks, furthermore, were highly
gendered, as though both migrant men and women stand to benefit
from marriage to a British-born person in the form of a fiancé or
spouse visa, the public archetype of the ‘sham’ marriage of conve-
nience is of extractive ‘bogus husbands’ misleading vulnerable, inno-
cent British women (Wray, 2015). The same is seen in British-born
Rani's interview, where her first marriage—to a cousin from Mirpur—
broke down amid financial acrimony associated with his remitting
money to his parents. After the divorce and some ten years spent as a
single mother, Rani made the decision to marry a migrant student, a
bachelor whom she met via a ‘halal dating’ scheme organised by her
university's Islamic Society2. This caused great conflict, as her parents
were unwilling to let her be ‘taken advantage of’ by a man they pre-
sumed to be motivated primarily by his need for a U.K. visa:
It was a real conflict negotiation, but dad came round
in the end. The local Imam got in touch and said, ‘Look,
what's your problem?’ And dad said what he said and
he [the Imam] goes, ‘Look, I understand you have
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concerns. He doesn't have a permanent visa, so you're
concerned that your daughter's going to be taken
advantage of as in the previous marriage. I understand
that, but you know, they want to do the halal thing at
the end of the day and you're just going to have to see
what's going to happen.’ Anyway, we didn't arrange
any wedding until dad gave us the OK.
Whilst these participants repeated the transnational form in their
remarriages, therefore, their first marriages had led to such misgivings
about the risks of marrying in Pakistan that we can see these mar-
riages happening in spite of reservations, on behalf of the individual
participant, or by others in their natal families. Such misgivings were
also seen in the interviews with participants who had first transna-
tional marriages followed by a remarriage with a British-born spouse,
as I now discuss.
3.2 | Considered preference for a British-born
spouse
Like Afshan above, British-born 30 year old Najma characterised her
first marriage, to a cousin from Mirpur, as unambiguously forced.
Nonetheless, she insisted that she had strived to make her transna-
tional marriage work. She described her embarrassment and physical
revulsion at his habits, singling out his consumption of chewing
niswaak bark, to clean his teeth, as particularly unpleasant:
I was 21 now and he was here, we're like a married
couple. And then I used to walk down the street and
see a guy and a girl holding hands and I used to look at
them and think that's genuine, this isn't. And he was
quite embarrassing ‘cause they classed him as a freshie
and I found him quite embarrassing ‘cause … his habits,
he'd take the niswaak, you know what niswaak is? He
used to take that and just spit, and he was just not
hygienic. Seriously, and that was a big off put. And I'm
not being big-headed or anything, I used to wanna
walk with someone that I feel comfortable walking
with, you know, someone more on my level. I tried so
much to groom him and make him look nice, bought
him loads of designer clothes and stuff but he just
wouldn't hold it and it was just the way he was. And I
just felt it wasn't fair on him either, me trying to mould
him into something he wasn't.
Taken on its own, this quote smacks of a deep internal racism. It
chimes with Charsley and Bolognani's (2017) study, where tropes of
disgust and bodily revulsion proved to be very prominent in stereotyp-
ical depictions of ‘freshies’ and mangetars. Najma's interview went on
to allow us to read this in even more complex ways, as her objection to
her first husband went beyond his dress sense and use of niswaak to
brush his teeth. While she was the one with the cultural capitals and
privileges of British nationality, he was the one who exercised eco-
nomic control in the marriage. He was possessive, and sexually posses-
sive, even forceful—showing how an intersectional analysis of power
must proceed simultaneously across different social domains, and how
multiple social locations may ascribe and deny power in different situa-
tions. The second time round, Najma married a former boyfriend from
college, who was also exiting an unsuccessful transnational marriage.
The interview with British-born Munir took similar contours, in
that he followed an arranged transnational marriage with a love
marriage to a British-born woman—a British Indian Sikh divorcee, as
Munir's remarriage was one of the inter-ethnic remarriages in the
study.1 His first marriage was with a maternal cousin in Pakistan. He
emphasised his lack of say over the match and how it had been his
mother's wish. He said he'd genuinely persevered with the marriage
and been committed, but
She came over at a very young age, she was 3–4 years
younger than me. Our family kept her back, she never
went to school. Couldn't speak English.3 She went
through that traditional education, you know, Urdu,
Arabic, namaz (praying), roza (fasting).
From the very start, it didn't work. There was nothing
in common, no chemistry.
Narratives followed about his first wife's frustration with him, and
his with her, and of the involvement of her natal kin in picking up the
pieces after their increasingly forceful arguments.
I'd had a very promiscuous life, before my marriage as
well, she knew very well about it. When we were
together, it was arguments, fighting, no communica-
tion, hardly any communication. When we did, it was
all bad—it was all my fault and she'd go back to her
mum's. I'd be the one to go and fetch her back.
Unpacking these conflicts, Munir chuckled as he intimated to the
underlying sexual dynamics:
I think the underlying problem was sexual really. I was
active and she wasn't. I was overactive! [Chuckles] and
that's important! That, for me, was the thing that was
tearing me apart.
We're still together, even now, on paper. I'm very loyal,
loyalty for me, is very important. She's still the mother
of my three kids. We're still married. But I just hap-
pened to meet somebody. Accident really. Likeminded.
I started seeing her, I got into her and she got into me.
This was different. This was a meeting of mind and
heart, and she was – available! I just went for it,
regardless.
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Munir's interview exemplifies the ‘reinvention’ of polygamy, as
Charsley and Liversage (2013) have observed, as a way for men to
meet their ‘dual aspirations’: they can secure parental approval for
their first, arranged marriage, as well as their personal desires for
emotional and sexual intimacy through their second marriage. Najma's
interview above, and Rani's, suggest that divorce and remarriage may
do the same for women. The first marriage might allow them to fulfil
parental hopes for an arranged marriage, but then, if the marriage
does not work out, they could remarry the second time round with a
greater degree of personal say, first choosing their spouse themselves
and inviting their families to vet their chosen spouse and give approval
afterwards (Qureshi, 2016: 254–61). It is important to note the kinds
of representations of the Pakistan-born spouse that these narratives
perform, creating the figure of the ‘freshie’ as unscrupulous, venal,
selfish, even abusive with finances; physically repulsive; and sexually
deviant: sexually controlling and forceful, in Najma's case, or inhibited,
in Munir's. Later, I will explore ways in which marriage migrants
developed reciprocal stereotypes.
3.3 | A transnational remarriage to expand the net
This section addresses cases showing the reverse pattern, whereby
first marriages between two British-born spouses were followed by
transnational marriages. Zulfi's analysis, in the opening vignette, of the
global geosocial inequalities that enable those with limited marital
capital locally in the United Kingdom to remarry in Pakistan is exem-
plified by the three cases in my study where participants followed a
first marriage between two British-born spouses with a transnational
remarriage. Significantly, two of these cases concerned transnational
remarriages which allowed a British-born partner to remarry in spite
of reputational concerns. In the first case, Shoaib, 30 years old, had
exited a first arranged marriage to a British-born cousin that did not
work out. His first wife had continued to see her boyfriend from
college, and Shoaib had spent several years in prison after violently
attacking his rival. After he was released from prison, his parents
began searching for a proposal for remarriage among the family in
Mirpur. But, he explained, they were thwarted in this endeavour by
‘jealous relatives’ who sabotaged potential rishte (proposals) by letting
out the secret of Shoaib's prison sentence. His parents searched long
and far for a family unaware of the prison sentence, and eventually
found the family of Samina, an unmarried woman from a different
province of Pakistan altogether.
Before Samina's family finally agreed, there was three
other girls that said ‘yes’, the families said ‘yes’ but then
they turned us down, because information was being
passed from here over there, through this middle-man,
and he was telling them ‘look, he's been to prison, he's
a bad guy, he's this he's that, these people are like, very
bad people’, things like that … We finally found out,
you know, what was happening, but I did eventually
find a family.
In the second such case, now 54-year old Razzaq had rem-
arried to Haseena, an unmarried cousin in Pakistan, following his
divorce from a British-born woman, prompted by his development
of florid psychosis. Razzaq's family had hidden this information
from Haseena's family throughout the marriage negotiations; she
only found out when she was 8 months pregnant with their first
child.
He was married before, he's got a wife and kids. I think
he was ill, and that's why his wife left him, because
when he started like that and she couldn't handle it. So
then his mum and dad went back home a little while
later [to look for proposals]. We never knew about this
illness he got. In my family, nobody knew. I found out
when my son was born, that he's ill, he's taking
medication.
Returning to the question of how British citizenship and
nationality inflects marital capital, it is not insignificant that these
transnational remarriages happened with unmarried, younger
women from Pakistan. Studies of intra-national, cross-regional
patri-virilocal marriages (for example Davin, 2008 on China) have
also observed that long-distance marriages can enable deception to
take place, and draw out the gendered dimensions whereby such
marriages are sustained by migrant brides for whom return to natal
kin is particularly difficult. The final section now turns to cases of
former migrant spouses remarrying a migrant in or from Pakistan,
where we see these inequalities of nationality and citizenship
reknitting after migrant spouses acquire Indefinite Leave to
Remain.
3.4 | How things change after permanent settlement
As Mirza (2016) has observed, for a migrant spouse exiting a transna-
tional marriage, with permanent settlement acquired, remarrying in
Pakistan could allow them to try and renegotiate the power dynamics
of the marriage. This was notable in interviews with migrant men,
who often described how a negative experience of marriage to a
British-born woman had led them to hope that a Pakistani national
might be comelier and more committed to marriage. Thirty-nine-year-
old Shakoor arrived in the United Kingdom in 1995 to marry a pater-
nal cousin who was British-born. His analysis of the breakdown of the
marriage centred on the idea of British-born women being brought up
without discipline, over-involved with their friends and insufficiently
enveloped in the home. He dismissed the marriage as loveless, a
ravaiati shaadi (traditional marriage) undermined by his wife's inability
to compromise;
When I came back from work my wife would not be at
home. I used to ask her mother “where is she”, she
wasn't doing any job, she just used to go outside with
her friends.
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Elaborating wider negative characterizations about British-born
women, Shakoor said ‘yahan ka mahol azad hai (the atmosphere here
is very free)’. When it came to his second marriage, there was no
question that he would marry another British-born woman. As he
explained,
If a girl is from here and a boy is from Pakistan,
between them there is zameen asmaan ka farq
(the earth and sky of difference) in their mental level.
In the second time around, he had an arranged marriage to a
never-married woman from outside his family and said he felt very
fortunate that his second marriage had been successful. The
stereotyping here is very palpable, further informing insights about
processes of intra-ethnic othering but from the perspective of migrant
spouses rather than British-born participants. Similar themes are
echoed in 33 year old Afzal's interview. Afzal had arrived in the United
Kingdom as an irregular migrant and married Kulsoom—also from
Pakistan, but a divorcee who had been in the United Kingdom for
7 years after a brief and unsuccessful transnational marriage—out of a
concern he described, quite explicitly, with securing lawful immigra-
tion status. He said he had always had reservations about marrying
someone British:
After I came here and saw the condition of the girls,
the style of the girls here, my heart was saying that I
should marry in Pakistan.
The marriage broke down after 12 years, amid great acrimony.
Over the course of my fieldwork, he remarried to a woman from his
extended family in Pakistan whom he characterized as ‘very nice’,
‘she can compromise’. Echoing Shakoor's sentiments almost
word-for-word, Afzal told me,
Girls from over here, and girls from Pakistan, they are
different like earth and sky. But when a girl comes
from there to here, then some of them can change.
And then they also do the same, what others from here
are doing here, they develop the same attitude. It's not
that they cultivate it in their mind, but their friends
over here, they misguide them. They say to one
another, when they are making a new friend, ‘how long
you are here? How long you are living here, and how is
your husband?’. They all have the same recording.
‘Ok then, this is your right and that is your right, now
don't do this and that now, because you still have to
wait for a visa. When you get a visa, then you can take
your revenge (jitnee badlee leenee heen leen), if your
husband is zalim (cruel) and abuses you’.
Afzal also remarried in Pakistan, to an unmarried cousin, in the
hope that she would share his mentality, be less assertive, more pliant
and willing to compromise. As this implies, for a migrant spouse,
remarrying in Pakistan could allow them to gain power, across multi-
ple domains, in their second marriage. This is suggested again by
26-year-old Nida, who was divorced from an abusive British-born
husband. Nida's account of abuse at the hands of her in-laws was
harrowing, but reflected broader themes. Her mother-in-law confis-
cated her passport and refused to allow her access to a phone or to
calling cards that would allow her to speak to her parents in Pakistan.
Her mother-in-law did nothing to stop her brother-in-law slapping her
because, she told me, ‘he can do whatever he wants with you because
ham ap ko khareed ke laeen hain (we have purchased you)’. She was
made to sleep on the kitchen floor with the dogs; she said her
mother-in-law even instructed the grandchildren to spit in her food.
When Nida finally told her father in Pakistan about her ill-treatment,
he instructed her to put up with the abuse until she had her Indefinite
Leave to Remain, but her in-laws never applied for it, instead making
her to overstay her probationary spouse visa. After 6 years of mar-
riage, and 2 years spent in the insecurity of living as a visa overstayer,
Nida fled to a women's refuge and was supported in applying for
Indefinite Leave to Remain under the Domestic Violence Rule
(see Mirza, 2016). She was now contemplating remarriage to a relative
in Pakistan because, as she put it, ‘that way, if anything went wrong,
at least he wouldn't make a problem’.
Nida's interview suggests that migrants from Pakistan may suffer
the consequences of harmful immigration rules that enable domestic
control and violence, but also, that once they acquire permanent set-
tlement, they may sometimes seek to manoeuvre within the inequal-
ities engendered by immigration status to try to protect themselves in
their second marriages. This was exemplified in the case of Ruby,
herself a migrant woman from Pakistan, who came to the United
Kingdom through an arranged marriage at the age of 17 and exited
the marriage, after 5 years, due to domestic violence. Fleeing to a
women's refuge, she obtained Indefinite Leave to Remain through the
Domestic Violence Rule. Two years after the divorce she remarried, to
a bachelor from Pakistan, and in her second marriage, she negotiated
the power dynamics very differently. Mindful of the possibility that he
might leave her once he acquired his Indefinite Leave to Remain, she
made him sell some land in Pakistan, to give her money as security for
his visa application and travel expenses, and for a deposit for a house.
After his then 2-year probationary spouse visa expired, she met with
her local member of parliament and, telling him that she had doubts
about her husband's genuine commitment to the marriage, she
enlisted the MP's support in writing to the home office and requesting
the probationary visa to be extended by another 2 years, rather than
giving her husband Indefinite leave to remain.
I have documented other cases of British-born women using their
husbands' dependence upon them for a visa as a way of shoring up
their power in the marriage, including the use of this same strategy of
enlisting their local MP to instruct the home office to extend the pro-
bationary spouse visa rather than supporting their spouses in applying
for indefinite leave to remain (Qureshi, 2016: 263–4)—a process
enabled by the home office's anticipation of ‘sham marriages’
(Wemyss, Yuval-Davis, & Cassidy, 2018; Wray, 2015). In this way,
remarrying in Pakistan could be a means of self-protection after the
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negative experience of their first marriage. However, it was an uncer-
tain means of self-protection, as the fear was pronounced, that once
their husband acquired permanent settlement it would reverse the
dynamic. Further, for Ruby, as for other women I have described in
my wider study (e.g., Qureshi, 2016: 265–6), this went on to become
a source of domestic conflict, as she told me her second husband was
psychologically abusing her over her refusal to endorse his Indefinite
Leave to Remain.
4 | CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
My study finds that ambivalences concerning transnational marriages
are honed through participants' experiences of their first marriages.
Even in those cases where the transnational form of a first marriage is
repeated in the remarriage, participants—and their natal families, who
offer advice about potential spouses—express reluctance and concern
at the risks it may entail. There is the opposite pattern too, where
transnational first marriages are followed by intra-national
remarriages, where participants express a desire to inch towards their
ideal form of conjugal relationship by making a match very different
from their first. Nonetheless, remarriages continue to be an important
route for ongoing marriage migration, as remarriage in Pakistan seems
to allow participants with British nationality and citizenship to circum-
vent the gendered devaluation of marital capital associated with
divorce. Further, once they acquire permanent settlement, marriage
migrants exiting from first transnational marriages seem to prefer to
remarry another migrant, due to experiences of marital hardship that
they attribute to internal racial discrimination and to the use of
harmful immigration rules to exercise domestic control. They may
even use the very same immigration rules to try to protect themselves
in their second marriages, although this means of self-protection was
uncertain.
U.K. immigration rules see and create migrant spouses as legal
persons of dispensable and of questionable value. Up to the acquisi-
tion of indefinite leave to remain, the moment the marriage breaks
down, a migrant spouse stands at risk of immigration removal, unless
entitlement to exemption on the basis of the domestic violence rule
can be proven. This devaluing of migrant spouses is reflected in the
stereotypes developed by participants in transnational marriages, who
may view their own fiancé or spouse as a ‘freshie’. I have followed
Charsley and Bolognani (2017) in examining the forms taken by, as
well as the fact of intra-ethnic boundary-marking. Migrant spouses
may be depicted as undesirable, unscrupulous, physically repulsive
and sexually deviant—excessively controlling or inhibited. Charsley
and Bolognani (2017) highlight the centrality of these tropes of sexual
deviance and bodily disgust in British Pakistanis' negative stereotypes
concerning ‘freshies’ and mangetars. They argue that these tropes
make sense in the context of continued transnational marriage—
which, defying any easy ‘generational’ boundary-making, shows ‘the
meeting of already unstable categories (British/Pakistani) in marital
unions and as part of young British Pakistanis’ negotiations of desir-
able marriage practices' (46). My study substantiates their call to
follow through the effects of these racial/ethnic hierarchies on trans-
national marriages. As they rightly say, ‘the figure of the freshie does
not operate at merely a symbolic level, or with respect only to pro-
cesses affecting the British Pakistanis who employ it’ (58). They draw
on Tyler's (2013) critique of Kristeva-inspired discussions of the
‘abject’, quoting ‘we should not ignore “what it means to be made
abject, to be one who repeatedly finds herself the object of the
other's violent objectifying disgust”’ (Charsley & Bolognani, 2017: 58).
In this paper, I have signalled what it might mean for migrants to be
the object of their spouse's disgust. I have also outlined reciprocal
forms of intra-ethnic othering that Pakistan-born migrant spouses
may develop about British-born people. Here, as in the case of
Singaporean nostalgia for the comely ‘foreign bride’ (Zhang &
Yeoh, 2019), Louisa Schein's (1997: 73) analytic of ‘internal oriental-
ism’ seems germane, stressing ‘the adoption of Western orientalist
logics and premises for self-representation in the course of Asian pro-
cesses of identity production’. But as racism is defined by the power
relations in which speakers are positioned, these reciprocal slurs
concerning British-born Pakistanis have relatively lesser purchase over
those whom they intend to denigrate. Further, in cases where
Pakistan-born spouses themselves remarry in Pakistan, they may also
recapitulate aspects of a racialised discourse about untrustworthy
‘freshies’ and mangetars. This reflects their renegotiation of power in
their intimate lives, and suggests an irreducible ambivalence that
persists about marriage migration, as a channel to immigration as well
as to intimacy.
Gendered ‘power geometries’ (Mahler & Pessar, 2001) are
suggested throughout the corpus of remarriages, yet the patterns of
gendered agency are highly complex and shifting, depending on the
interlocking and intersecting of social locations, differing over
geosocial scales and in different domains. Male privilege may allow
divorcees to remarry with greater ease (see Qureshi, 2016: 224), while
British nationality, citizenship and permanent settlement status may
raise a participant's marital capital in a transnational social field. My
study demonstrates the necessity of a combined intersectional and
transnational approaches in the study of divorce and remarriage in a
‘diaspora space’ (Brah, 1996) such as that connecting Britain and
Pakistan. I extend the arguments of Fresnoza-Flot and Shinozaki
(2017), who foreground generation as an axis of intersectional
gendered power in transnational families. To this, I add that we
need not only to examine distinctions by first-generation or second-
generation status but also, how an individual may traverse between
generational categories over the course of their migration and settle-
ment history, inhabiting a different position in these racialised
hierarchies of nationality and citizenship in their remarriage compared
to their first.
Finally, this paper shows that it is crucial to build remarriage into
an analysis of transnational ‘marriagescapes’ (Constable, 2005) and
distinguish between the instabilities of first marriages and
remarriages. I underline Grover's (2014) call for greater feminist atten-
tion to remarriage. As she argues, the existing scholarship has shown
some unsubstantiated assumptions about divorce as an expression of
the pursuit of intimate ideals, personal fulfilment and compatibility
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(cf. Giddens, 1992). Largely, we have presumed that the freedom to
remarry is liberating. In my study, I have shown some participants to
be making bold choices in their remarriages, choosing their second
spouses with a greater extent of personal say. Yet as in
Grover's (2014) study of informal settlements in Delhi, second
marriages do not necessarily offer happy endings, and may tend to
reproduce the gender asymmetries of primary arranged marriages.
The risks associated with remarriage remain strikingly gendered, even
if gendered power is not stable but shifts across transnational and
intersectional axes.
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1 Most of the interethnic marriages in the corpus were in fact remarriages
(see Qureshi, 2016: 27).
2 ‘Halal dating’ refers to forms of premarital/extramarital relationships
which are deemed Islamically appropriate, namely, with other single
Muslims who are interested in marriage, see Ahmad (2012).
3 As noted in the introduction, under the current immigration rules, such
marriages are restricted due to the English language requirements
imposed. Munir's first marriage took place in the late 1970s.
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